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█ Abstract  My first aim in this article is to describe the origin of the notion of culture of knowledge due to the re-
search activities carried out at the University of Frankfurt by the Research Group Culture of Knowledge and Social 
Change since 1999. In this context we examined the relation between knowledge and society and proposed the no-
tion of culture of knowledge as a key-concept to emphasize that knowledge does always appear in a specific histori-
cal form, and can be investigated only as a social practice. This key-concept turned out to be a helpful heuristic 
construct and had therefore a widespread diffusion as a general and extremely flexible category which can shed 
light on mutual relations between knowledge and culture in several historical contexts. Secondly, I will compare 
the approach taken in the culture of knowledge with other contextualist approaches of contemporary research areas 
like History of Science and Theory of Culture to show that it is particularly helpful in terms of connecting different 
fields. Finally, I will drive attention to a basic question concerning the approach of the culture of knowledge which 
remains still unanswered. The Frankfurter Research Group considered it as a model of knowledge alternative to 
all those positions in History of Science and Theory of Culture that assume the universal, trans-historical, and 
trans-cultural validity of fundamental forms of knowledge and cognitive abilities. I will discuss whether and to 
what extent these positions are really alternative, and for this purpose I will focus on a central point: whether the 
thesis of a radical historicity of knowledge undermines the very idea of universal rationality and to what extent. 
KEYWORDS: Cultures of Knowledge; Contextualism; History of Science; Epistemology; Models of Knowledge.  
 
█ Riassunto  Il contestualismo epistemologico e le culture epistemiche – In questo articolo intendo illustrare la na-
scita della nozione di cultura epistemica nell’ambito delle indagini svolte presso l’Università di Francoforte 
dall’unità di ricerca Cultura epistemica e mutamento sociale a partire dal 1999. In questo contesto si è indagato il 
rapporto tra sapere e società e proposto la nozione di cultura epistemica come concetto-chiave per sottolineare 
come il sapere compaia sempre in una forma storica specifica, e come questo stesso possa essere indagato solo co-
me pratica sociale. Questo concetto-chiave si è rivelato un concetto euristicamente fruttuoso e perciò nel frattem-
po ha conosciuto ampia diffusione come categoria generale ed estremamente flessibile per gettar luce sui reciproci 
rapporti tra sapere e cultura in diversi contesti storici. Inoltre, intendo comparare l’approccio delle culture epistemi-
che con altri approcci propri della ricerca contemporanea in arre come la storia della scienza e la teoria della cultura 
per mostrarne l’utilità nel relazionare tra loro campi diversi. Infine, voglio portare l’attenzione su un problema di 
fondo, ancora aperto, che riguarda l’approccio delle culture epistemiche. L’unità di ricerca francofortese ha inteso 
questo approccio come modello di conoscenza alternativo a tutte quelle posizioni nella storia della scienza e nella 
teoria della cultura che assumono la validità universale, trans-culturale e trans-storica, delle forme fondamentali 
del sapere e delle capacità cognitive. Intendo discutere se e fino a che punto queste posizioni siano realmente alter-
native. Per questo mi concentrerò su un elemento centrale: se e fino a che punto con la tesi della radicale storicità 
del sapere venga intaccata l’idea stessa di una razionalità universale. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Culture epistemiche; Contestualismo; Storia della scienza; Epistemologia; Modelli della conoscenza. 
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█ Epistemological contextualism  
 and skepticism 
 
MOST PEOPLE AND MANY EPISTEMOLOGISTS 
are convinced that  
(1) they know a lot, 
(2) knowledge is infallible, and 
(3) knowledge claims are fallible.  
These three thoughts create a serious para-
dox that seems to imply scepticism.1 One way 
of expressing this consequence is to maintain 
that knowledge is an absolute concept. That is 
to say, there is, in our world, no mental state 
that is absolute knowledge excluding all possi-
ble evidence that it might not be knowledge. At 
most a mental state can be, it seems, called 
knowledge if it is, as a matter of fact, an ap-
proximation to knowledge. But knowledge 
does not come in grades. Therefore, an approx-
imation to knowledge is not knowledge at all. 
Thus, in our world knowledge cannot be had. 
And this is exactly what the skeptic urges.2 
The most plausible diagnosis of this situa-
tion is that thoughts (1)–(3) come down to 
conceiving of knowledge as natural kind (as 
epistemological realists do) and trying to find a 
foundation for knowledge other than 
knowledge itself (as epistemological founda-
tionalists do). That is, the paradox follows from 
epistemological realism and epistemological 
foundationalism that are, in turn, the most 
fundamental assumptions guiding traditional 
epistemology. If we stick to traditional episte-
mology, we generate the paradox and are 
forced to surrender to the skeptic.3 
One way of dealing with this skeptical threat 
is to insist that knowledge is context-sensitive, i.e. 
to urge that it depends on the context which 
standards of justification are accepted and which 
premises are taken for granted and thus, wheth-
er true beliefs count as knowledge or not. This 
familiar kind of epistemological contextualism re-
lies on the traditional JTB-account of knowledge 
(treating knowledge as justified true belief). Ac-
cording to epistemological contextualism 
knowledge is some sort of true belief, but it is 
justification that makes knowledge context-
sensitive. More precisely, it is not only justifica-
tion that is context-sensitive, but also, for in-
stance, epistemic goals, articulated doubts and 
social expectations of meeting objections.4 In 
particular, epistemic reasons R for belief p can 
have defeators D such that D-and-R is not an 
epistemic reason for p any more; however, de-
feators are context-sensitive.5  
From this point of view epistemological con-
textualism is often taken to be, by getting past 
traditional epistemology, the best way of escap-
ing scepticism. In particular, epistemological 
contextualists claim to be able to explain why 
most people and many epistemologists stick to 
thoughts (1)–(3). The explanation offered is 
that people neglect the context of knowledge 
claims and therefore falsely think that proposi-
tions expressed by knowledge claims uttered in a 
certain context are the same as propositions ex-
pressed by the same knowledge claims uttered in 
a different context. 
 
█ Epistemological contextualism as relevant 
alternatives account 
 
A popular form of epistemological contex-
tualism is the relevant alternatives account ac-
cording to which a claim to knowledge that p is 
correlated with possible alternatives being in-
compatible with p. Knowledge requires that we 
exclude all these alternatives. But mobilize your 
imagination, and you will find possible alterna-
tives that you cannot exclude. However, pro-
ponents of the relevant alternatives account 
stress that some of these alternatives are irrele-
vant, while others may be relevant. Most im-
portantly, which alternatives are relevant or ir-
relevant, respectively, is context-dependent.6  
For instance, in everyday life, whether a 
warehouse can be called empty depends on 
whether there are still goods around or not. In 
this context, the possible alternative that there 
are still molecules left in the house is clearly not 
relevant. In other contexts, however, this alter-
native may be relevant, for instance if we look 
at the warehouse as a gigantic vacuum-
chamber. Therefore, it can be maintained that 
in the everyday context, the warehouse is emp-
ty in the full sense (in which empty is taken as 
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absolute concept) iff there are no goods around 
anymore. It follows that from the fact that A is 
an absolute concept it cannot be derived that in 
our imperfect world there is nothing that is A 
in the full sense. In particular, then, the fact 
that knowledge is an absolute concept does not 
entail skeptical conclusions. Thus, according to 
the relevant alternatives account, knowledge is a 
belief such that the possible relevant alterna-
tives can be excluded. In this sense, knowledge 
can often be had.7  
However, there are two different sorts of 
possible alternatives to knowledge claims, one 
being determined by subjective factors concern-
ing the knower, the other being defined by as-
cription factors concerning the speaker who as-
cribes knowledge to somebody else. Epistemo-
logical contextualism, set out as relevant alter-
natives account, claims that not only subjective 
factors, but also ascription factors are context-
sensitive. If S believes, and claims to know, that 
there is a barn in front of her, and if speaker S* 
considers whether she should ascribe know-
ledge to S, in respect of this claim, then it is rel-
evant for this knowledge claim whether S and 
S* are in barn facades county or in a landscape 
where there are only a few, if any, barn facades. 
It is in the former but not in the latter context 
that for the belief to be knowledge the possible 
alternative of there being just a barn facade be 
eliminated. But what counts epistemologically 
is whether S* knows what the context is. If S* 
knows that they are in barn facade county, then 
S* will demand that S excludes the possibility of 
there being just a barn facade in order to be 
able to ascribe knowledge to S, whatever S 
thinks the context to be. 
Some epistemological contextualists sup-
porting the relevant alternatives account em-
phasize that ascription factors have an impact 
for the truth conditions or the meaning of 
knowledge sentences. So if ascription factors 
are context-sensitive, this will go for the mean-
ings of knowledge sentences too. Let AS* and 
AS** be two different contextual ascription fac-
tors, then the sentences S knows that p relative 
to AS* and S knows that p relative to AS** have 
different meanings. It turns out, then, that one 
important ingredient of epistemological con-
textualism is a contextualist semantics for 
knowledge sentences.8 
 
█ Standards of justification 
 
In its standard version epistemological con-
textualism does not reflect on the relations be-
tween different epistemic contexts nor between 
different standards of justification correlated 
with different epistemic contexts. This is cer-
tainly a theoretical deficit. There are some epis-
temological contextualists, though, who seem 
to have realized this problem. Shiffer, for ex-
ample, distinguishes between two standards of 
justification, Tough (in science) and Easy (in 
everyday life), respectively.9 David Annis, being 
a convinced epistemological contextualist, con-
cedes, in addition, that there has been a refine-
ment in the historical development of methods 
of discovery and testing, for instance in science, 
and thus, that there are not only different 
standards of justification, but also differently 
refined standards of justification.10 
Nevertheless Annis sticks to a relativist po-
sition. For he thinks that  
(a) if contexts C and C* with correlated jus-
tification standards S and S*, respectively, are 
differently refined (such that C* and S* are 
more refined, and so epistemically more ade-
quate, than C and S), and 
(b) if person P is justified to claim to know 
that p in C and under S, but not in C* and un-
der S*, then 
(c) P has knowledge of p in C and under S, 
even if P does not have knowledge of p in C* 
and under S*. 
The thought (a)–(c) articulates, as Annis 
emphasizes, precisely that justification and 
knowledge are context-dependent. But he does 
not realize that argument (a)–(c) defines a 
stronger version of epistemological contextual-
ism, that is, that we can distinguish 
(EC 1) Weak epistemological contextualism:  
(1) Knowledge depends on different contexts. 
(2) The contexts mentioned in (1) are not dif-
ferently refined. 
(EC 2) Strong epistemological contextualism:  
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(1) Knowledge depends on different contexts. 
(2) The contexts mentioned in (1) are differ-
ently refined. 
However, (E1) is, to say the least, much more 
plausible than (E2).  
Sometimes contextualists conceal the prob-
lem with (E2) by confusing knowledge and at-
tributions of knowledge. For example, Cohen 
wants to show that social standards are im-
portant for determining whether a person has 
knowledge; but a little later he puts his claim by 
saying that attributions of knowledge are con-
text-sensitive.11 Of course P knows that p if P* 
truly attributes the knowledge that p to P, but if 
S* attributes the knowledge that p to P, then it 
does not follow that P knows that p. Further-
more, we must, as we have seen, distinguish be-
tween the context the potential knower S is in 
and the context the speaker S* who considers to 
ascribe knowledge to S is in. And it must also be 
decided whether one of these contexts puts its 
inhabitants into a better epistemic position 
than the other. If so, claims to knowledge in the 
better context override claims to knowledge in 
the worse context – which is incompatible with 
strong epistemological contextualism. 
One of the most thoughtful epistemological 
contextualists, David Lewis, seems to agree 
with this conclusion by saying:  
 
Better knowledge is more stable knowledge: 
it stands more chance of surviving a shift 
of attention in which we begin to attend to 
some of the possibilities formerly ignored. 
If, in our new shifted context, we ask what 
knowledge we may truly ascribe to our ear-
lier selves, we may find that only the better 
knowledge of our earlier selves still de-
serves the name. And yet, if our former ig-
norings were proper at the time, even the 
worse knowledge of our earlier selves could 
truly have been called knowledge in the 
former context.12  
 
█ Mild epistemological contextualism 
 
The remark by David Lewis just quoted is 
important. One should add, though, that 
(i) the distinction between better and worse 
knowledge requires the distinction between 
better and worse epistemic contexts; 
(ii) if a belief can be called knowledge in a 
worse epistemic context, but not in a better ep-
istemic context, then, from the perspective of 
the better epistemic context, the belief could 
truly have been called knowledge in the worse 
context, but this belief was not knowledge; 
(iii) if there is a worse and a better epistemic 
context available at the same time, if a belief 
can be called knowledge in the worse, but not 
in the better epistemic context, then the belief 
in the worse epistemic context could not even 
have been truly called knowledge in the worse 
context. 
From this point of view epistemological 
contextualists can, and should, distinguish be-
tween three kinds of knowledge:  
Suppose person P believes truly that p, then  
(a) P a-knows that p iff there is an available 
epistemic context (including standards of justi-
fication) C (i.e. a context the community S be-
longs to is familiar with) such that P is, relative 
to C, justified in believing that p.  
(b) P b-knows that p iff P a-knows that p 
and  there is no available context C* better than 
C such that P is, relative to C*, not justified in 
believing that p.  
(c) P c-knows that p iff P b-knows that p and 
there is no better context C** whatsoever such 
that P is, relative to C**, not justified in believ-
ing that p.  
Obviously, c-knowledge cannot be achieved. 
But a-knowledge and b-knowledge can be had, 
and even if c-knowledge is beyond our reach, 
this does not exclude that much of what we a-
know or b-know is in fact c-knowledge. One of 
the failures of skepticism is not to see this. It fol-
lows that 
(a) saying that we know a lot is to say that 
we a-know or b-know a lot (implying that we 
have, so far, reasons to believe that this 
knowledge is in fact c-knowledge);  
(b) saying that we are all good fallibilists is 
to say that c-knowledge cannot be known to 
have been reached.  
There is nothing inconsistent in entertain-
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ing both claims (a) and (b). If people feel un-
happy about splitting the notion of knowledge, 
no problem. We should not argue about termi-
nology. We can likewise say that c-knowledge 
is the notion of knowledge, while a-knowledge 
and b-knowledge are two important forms of 
context-sensitive justified defeasible ascriptions of 
knowledge. In any case, it follows, obviously, 
that a-knowledge and b-knowledge come in 
grades, while c-knowledge remains an all-or-
nothing affair. More importantly, distinguish-
ing between better and worse epistemological 
contexts and between three kinds of justifica-
tion provides the conceptual resources to in-
troduce a notion of ideal or perfect knowledge 
(roughly c-knowledge). It is only against the 
background of such a notion of perfect 
knowledge that we can talk about better or 
worse contexts and about defeasibility condi-
tions of context-sensitive justified knowledge 
ascriptions. In this sense it is, in talking about 
contexts of knowledge, not only possible, but 
even necessary to bring a notion of ideal 
knowledge into play. 
If epistemological contextualists accept that  
(i) talking about contexts that are epistemo-
logically better or worse is possible and some-
times even necessary, 
(ii) knowledge comes in three kinds (a-
knowledge, b-knowledge, and c-knowledge, 
according to (a)–(c) above), and 
(iii) to talk about context-sensitive episte-
mological contexts we need a conceptual grasp 
of what ideal perfect knowledge would look 
like,  
then epistemological contextualism turns 
into a mild form, viz. mild epistemological con-
textualism. 
 
█ Non-veritistic social epistemology 
 
Another brand of epistemological contextu-
alism is social epistemology which looks not 
only at contexts of knowledge, but in particular 
also at contexts of science. Social epistemology 
proceeds from the assumption that a sociologi-
cal analysis of science and scientific knowledge 
(that is, an analysis of social contexts of science) 
can be fruitful and illuminating. However, 
there are two sorts of social epistemology: Ver-
itistic and non-veritistic social epistemology. 
Non-veritistic social epistemology stresses 
that empirical, historical and sociological stud-
ies of scientific practices show that science and 
scientific results do not depend exclusively on 
the objective external world which, according 
to traditional epistemology and philosophy of 
science, is supposed to make scientific beliefs 
true or false, but rather also (even mainly or ex-
clusively) on social arrangements resulting 
from negotiations between scientists taking 
place in the course of scientific practices. The 
crucial idea is that science, scientific 
knowledge, and scientific practices are socially 
determined.  
Non-veritistic social epistemology proposes 
three fundamental theses:13  
(i) Contingency thesis: Natural sciences 
could have developed in alternative ways. The 
way natural sciences have in fact developed is 
not inevitable, but was to a certain extent con-
tingent.14  
(ii) Nominalist thesis: At most some indi-
vidual things, but not facts or universals, can be 
taken to exist independently of humans and 
their social actions.  
(iii) Stability thesis: Explanations for the 
stability of scientific beliefs must rely at least in 
part on social factors that are external to the 
internal criteria of theory choice maintained in 
modern natural sciences and articulated in ra-
tionalist philosophies of science. 
The earliest prominent version of non-
veritistic social epistemology is the Edinburgh 
school of the sociology of science (sometimes 
called the strong programme of the sociology of 
science). The proponents of this school urge 
that all sciences including mathematics and 
natural sciences are socially determined. More-
over, it is not only the historical development 
of science, its rise and success, that is influenced 
by social forces; rather, it is also the content of 
accepted scientific beliefs that is determined by 
social factors or social interests being involved 
in scientific practices.  
The four methodological principles guiding 
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the Edinburgh school of the sociology of sci-
ence are: 
(i) Causality, i.e. exploration conditions that 
causally bring about claims to some sort of 
knowledge.  
(ii) Impartiality, i.e. examination of success-
ful as well as unsuccessful knowledge claims.  
(iii) Symmetry, i.e. use of the same types of 
explanations for successful and unsuccessful 
knowledge claims alike.  
(iv) Reflexivity, i.e. application of the theory 
to itself.15 
From their sociological studies the Edin-
burgh sociologists of science conclude that 
there is no definite unique set of rational meth-
ods that guide scientific practices and can be 
referred to in order to explain how scientific 
results and beliefs are established. Another re-
sult is that a sharp distinction between the con-
text of discovery and the context of justifica-
tion is not helpful in sociological investigations 
of scientific practices. In this way, the Edin-
burgh school rejects fundamental assumptions 
held by the traditional philosophy of science. In 
terms of epistemological contextualism these 
results seem to show that, not the distinction 
between the context of discovery and the con-
text of justification, but different standards of 
rationality are parts of epistemic contexts. 
On this view the sociological analysis of sci-
entific practices must be a causal explanation of 
belief formation: it is supposed to show in de-
tail how specific scientific beliefs are estab-
lished as a result of causal processes proceeding 
from social conditions, social interests, and ne-
gotiations between scientists.16 Therefore, so-
cial epistemology is, in the view of the Edin-
burgh school, itself a kind of natural science. It 
can also be formulated as a methodological 
claim mandating a naturalistic approach to sci-
entific practises. As such, social epistemology is 
best understood as being part of a naturalized 
epistemology concentrating on the investiga-
tion of social causes of belief formation and is 
committed to the claim that scientific 
knowledge cannot simply be seen as an ade-
quate representation of the external objective 
world, but must rather be taken to be the result 
of an extremely complex process involving 
mainly social causes. In this way, social episte-
mology is not only a form of anti-rationalism, 
but also a form of anti-realism and relativism. 
Another version of a non-veritistic social 
epistemology is the actor-network theory.17 In 
this version it is claimed that scientific 
knowledge flows from established relations be-
tween objects, animals and humans engaged in 
scientific practices. An actor is supposed to be 
everything that in some causal way affects the 
production of scientific theories: not only sci-
entists and their actions, but also, for instance, 
background assumptions, methodologies, 
techniques, social rules and institutions, rou-
tines, experiments, measurements and the ap-
propriate instruments as well as scientific texts. 
There are many kinds of interactions between 
actors; in particular, some actors can transform 
other actors. A network is a set of actors such 
that there are relations and transformations be-
tween the actors that are stable, in this way de-
termining the place and functions of the actors 
within the network. Once a network has been 
established it implies a closure that prevents 
other actors or relations from entering the net-
work, thereby opening the possibility of accu-
mulating scientific knowledge that is the result 
of transformations within the network.  Estab-
lishing a scientific belief or theory or fact comes 
down, from the point of view of the actor-
network theory, to placing these actors in a sta-
ble network. In this sense, scientific beliefs, 
knowledge, and theories are taken to be con-
structed by transformations taking place in es-
tablished networks. Obviously, the actor-
network theory takes the actor-network to be 
the epistemic context of scientific knowledge.18 
A well-known general objection against 
non-veritistic approaches to social epistemolo-
gy is that the leading studies use empirical, so-
ciological and historical evidence to justify fun-
damental and far-reaching claims that are sup-
posed to debunk the epistemic authority and 
universal rationality of the sciences. Obviously, 
in doing so they rely themselves on exactly 
those scientific methods they try to debunk. 
For instance, the claim that «there are no con-
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text-free or super-cultural norms of rationali-
ty»19 can only be defended by carefully examin-
ing the historical and cultural evidence as well as 
by applying the hypothetical-deductive method.  
 
█ Veritistic social epistemology 
 
Veritistic social epistemology aims at identi-
fying and evaluating social interactions, prac-
tices and forces that influence – in a positive or 
negative way – the pursuit of truth and the 
production of true justified beliefs.20 On this 
view, science and education place a positive val-
ue (“veritistic value”) on having true beliefs ra-
ther than false beliefs. Social interactions, prac-
tices and forces that influence – in a positive or 
negative way – the pursuit of truth include 
communicational acts (like discussions and cor-
respondence between scientists), institutional 
structures that frame such acts (like universities, 
journals publishing peer reviewed articles, or 
conferences), speech practices (of reporting and 
arguing), ways of access to different sorts of in-
formation (libraries, internet resources), market 
mechanisms regulating the flow of speech, in-
formation technologies, legal systems, and ways 
of disseminating information.21 
Another social aspect of science is the divi-
sion of cognitive labour.22 For instance, it will 
optimize the scientific pursuit of adequate and 
successful theories if different members of a 
scientific community pursue different strate-
gies of solving a scientific problem, rather than 
all work on the most promising strategy. Sci-
ence can, on this view, only make progress if it 
relies on a social consensus practice that in-
cludes an exploitation of reliable scientific au-
thorities, formal and empirical methodologies 
and background assumptions.23 
Basically, there is nothing wrong with ver-
itistic approaches to social epistemology. This 
is not to say, though, that there are no open 
problems with this view. For example, one of the 
topics that need to be addressed is in which way 
the pursuit, not of true beliefs, but of justified 
beliefs can be socially determined. In this con-
text, the problem of reliable testimony must be 
discussed.24 In addition, the historical change of 
epistemic practices and cultures of knowledge 
seems to involve a relativism of rationality and 
justification.25 In any case, veritistic social epis-
temology presents a fairly rich view about epis-
temic contexts including communicational 
acts, institutional structures, journals, speech 
practices, ways of access to, and dissemination 
of, information, information technologies, legal 
systems, division of cognitive labour, and social 
consensus practices. 
 
█ Theories of cultures of knowledge 
 
Another way of addressing the social aspects 
of science in is to develop theories of cultures of 
knowledge. The starting point of such theories is 
the idea that knowledge is often intrinsically tied 
to epistemic cultures, and epistemic contexts can 
be treated as a sort of culture.  
This approach relies on a notion of culture 
and is committed to outline this much debated 
notion. Basically we can distinguish universal, 
epistemic, semantic and social conceptions of 
culture. In the universal sense, culture is the 
whole set of human social activities; in the epis-
temic sense, the culture of a social group is the 
group’s entire knowledge;26 in the semantic 
sense, culture is a system or net of meanings;27 
and in the social sense, the culture of a social 
group is the group’s system of social rules.28 If 
we want to reflect on cultures of knowledge, 
then it seems obvious that the universal notion 
of culture is too broad, while the epistemic and 
semantic notions of culture are in danger of 
producing a circular definition of cultures of 
knowledge. Therefore, cultures of knowledge 
should be treated as a brand of cultures in the 
social sense. However, this sort of culture must 
be worked out a bit more precisely: 
Cultures in the social sense  
(1) consist basically in certain human prac-
tices some of which are practices of rule-
following.  
(2) These practices are usually correlated 
with background assumptions guiding the 
methods and goals of the practices.  
(3) In addition – and very importantly – the 
practices and background assumptions are 
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handed down to following generations in a cumu-
lative way by teaching and learning.  
(4) Part of this historical process are power 
relations between teacher and student; in par-
ticular, in social cultures regulative power is 
prominent, viz. the power to get other persons 
to follow certain rules.29 
Alternatively, we can define cultures in the 
social sense as a set of people such that these 
people, and only these people, exercise certain 
practices that satisfy conditions (1)–(4). Social 
cultures in this sense are not determined by local 
or ethnic or national contexts, but rather by his-
torical chains that can be reconstructed in terms 
of theories of social learning.30 In particular, 
since there are presumably no sets of practices 
such that all and only the people of a certain na-
tion exercise these practices, there are probably 
no national cultures in the social sense. 
This notion of a social culture can easily be 
specified to a notion of epistemic cultures: 
Epistemic cultures 
(5) consist basically in certain human prac-
tices (some of which are practices of rule-
following) aiming at producing, selecting, and 
disseminating (scientific) knowledge (true jus-
tified beliefs).  
(6) Knowledge is taken to be a mental state, 
i.e. a brain-state displaying correctness condi-
tions und thus, providing representations and 
operating in the space of reasons.31 
(7) These practices are usually correlated 
with background assumptions determining the 
methods and goals of producing knowledge 
and outlining a notion of what perfect 
knowledge would look like. 
(8) In addition – and very importantly – the 
practices and background assumptions indicat-
ed in (6) are handed down to following genera-
tions in a cumulative way by teaching and learn-
ing the production of knowledge in education 
institutions like schools and universities.32  
(9) Part of this historical process are power 
relations between teachers and students in 
schools and universities; in particular, in epis-
temic cultures regulative power is prominent, 
viz. the power to get other persons to follow the 
rules of producing knowledge. 
Finally, as a first move we can introduce the 
notion of cultures of knowledge simply by identi-
fying cultures of knowledge with epistemic cul-
tures. In the framework of theories of cultures 
of knowledge, it is the epistemic culture that is 
supposed to be the epistemological context for 
states of knowledge. 
To investigate cultures of knowledge comes 
down to analyzing the epistemic practices of a 
group of people and exploring the social reali-
zation of these practices. Examining cultures of 
knowledge is an attempt, not to examine simp-
ly the social conditions in which theories did 
rise and fall, as traditional social epistemology 
has it, but to look at the complex of epistemic 
practices, theories and ideals of knowledge, as 
well as their social conditions and realizations. 
The point is not to treat definitions of 
knowledge as mere ideological epiphenomena, 
but to relate them to epistemic practices and 
the social environment.33  
 
█ Veritistic versus non-veritistic social 
epistemology: A brief comparison 
 
In the last two decades, there has been an 
ongoing controversial debate between propo-
nents of veritistic and non-veritistic versions of 
social epistemology. Indeed, it is hard to imag-
ine how a consensus between the parties could 
be achieved. Actually, one can look at the two 
approaches as belonging to very different scien-
tific projects. The representational and sensi-
tive mind is, as the modern theory of mind has 
it, realized in physical states and things. There-
fore it is certainly possible to explore mental 
states and minded animals exclusively in terms 
of their physical realizers.34 This possibility is 
exploited by non-veritistic approaches to social 
epistemology. These approaches are looking 
exclusively at causal relations between thinkers 
and elements of epistemological contexts. 
Therefore, they don´t care whether thinkers 
have true or false beliefs, and they don´t care 
either whether thinkers develop successful or 
unsuccessful theories. For taking into account 
the difference between true and false beliefs or 
between successful and unsuccessful theories 
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comes down to treat thinkers, their beliefs, 
their theories and their epistemic activities as 
belonging to the space of reasons. 
As already mentioned above, one problem 
is that the non-veritistic approach to social 
epistemology cannot be applied to itself. An-
other problem is that this approach talks, 
among other things, about negotiations and 
discussions between scientists as having impact 
on what beliefs and theories will be selected 
and accepted; these processes take place, 
though, in the space of reasons which indicates 
an inconsistency. A third problem is that non-
veritistic approaches don’t have the resources 
for distinguishing between beliefs coming 
about by, say manipulation or political repres-
sion and beliefs coming about in a free non-
repressive intellectual environment; that is to 
say, these approaches cannot explore the norma-
tive dimension of belief formation (ways of how 
belief formation should, and should not, come 
about). It must be conceded, however, that this 
physical stance toward belief formation can re-
sult in illuminating insights. At the same time, it 
must be stressed that this stance does not take 
into account those properties of some physical 
states and things that make them mental states 
and minded beings, respectively. 
In contrast, veritistic approaches to social 
epistemology aim to live up to an intentional 
stance towards belief formation, appreciating 
the representational and sensitive dimension of 
mental states and minded beings. Therefore, 
they do care whether thinkers have true or false 
beliefs, and they do care whether thinkers devel-
op successful or unsuccessful theories. In addi-
tion, these approaches can be applied to them-
selves and can do justice to the normative di-
mension of belief formation. This goes for theo-
ries of cultures of knowledge too. These theories 
belong, therefore, to the veritistic approaches to 
social epistemology. One might think that ver-
itistic approaches develop a fuller and richer pic-
ture of belief formation than non-veritistic ap-
proaches. Nevertheless it seems clear that these 
two views on the formation of beliefs, 
knowledge and scientific theories have quite dif-
ferent goals and look at quite different phenom-
ena. So it may be a waste of time and energy for 
each party to continue debating with each other 
instead of pursuing their specific objectives. 
 
█ Ingredients of epistemic contexts,  
 extended disquotational truth,  
 and superjustifiable belief 
 
Epistemological contextualists speculate a 
lot about context-dependent knowledge, but do 
not tell us what exactly they take epistemic con-
texts to be. From our discussion of different 
brands of epistemological contextualism we 
can conclude, though, that epistemological 
contextualists believe that the main ingredients 
of epistemic contexts are a language L, specific 
scientific presuppositions SC, epistemological 
assumptions EA about what knowledge and 
science in general are, a logic LO, a mathemat-
ics M, testing rules TR, and educational institu-
tions EI. So epistemic context C, taken as an ep-
istemic culture that can be, and is usually, 
taught, learned, handed down and institution-
alized, amounts basically to the structure C = 
<L, SC, EA, LO, M, TR, EI>.  
Now suppose that (i) S has belief b in con-
text C, (ii) b is true, (iii) S* being in context C* 
considers whether she should ascribe 
knowledge to b, (iv) C* is better than C, and (v) 
L in C is (of course) translatable into L* in C*; 
then we can distinguish different conditions 
(different types of situations) under which S* 
might feel to be justified to call b knowledge 
and so to  ascribe knowledge to S concerning b: 
(c1) the entire C (i.e. <L, SC, EA, LO, M, 
TR, EI>) is acceptable35 for S*; 
(c2) SC in C is not acceptable for S*, but 
everything else in C is; 
(c3) SC and EA are not acceptable for S*, 
but everything else in C is; and had EA been 
acceptable for S*, then by S*‘s lights, SC would 
have been acceptable for S*; 
(c4) SC and EA and TR are not acceptable 
for S*, but everything else in C is; and had SC 
and E been acceptable for S*, then by S*‘s lights, 
TR would have been acceptable for S*; 
(c5) SC and EA and TR and LO and M are 
not acceptable for S*, but had SC, EA, and TR 
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been acceptable for S*, then by S*‘s lights, LO 
and M would have been acceptable for S*.36 
Viewed from C*, (c1)–(c5) are increasingly 
weaker cases of knowledge ascription. The up-
shot of these distinctions is that if we make 
states of knowledge in a context dependent of 
true knowledge ascriptions being located in a 
different and better context (which is, I think, 
very often the case), then we get a fine-grained 
structure of knowledge states consisting of c-
knowledge, c1-knowledge (=b-knowledge), c2 
– c5 – kinds of knowledge, and a-knowledge.  
Mild epistemological contextualism implies 
not only a distinction between different kinds 
of context-dependent knowledge, but also  
(a) a notion of better or worse epistemic 
contexts, and  
(b) a notion of ideal perfect knowledge.37  
Point (a) requires, of course, to adopt some 
sort of universal standard of some sort of uni-
versal rationality from which we are able to 
evaluate which context may be better or worse 
than some other context. Form a contextualist 
point of view this may be a problematic as-
sumption. I cannot discuss this question here, 
but I want at least to indicate that Davidson´s 
conception of rationality may be helpful here, 
since it makes room for contextual differences 
of a basically universal rationality. 
Point (b), however, needs some elaboration. 
Epistemological contextualists should be able 
to talk about the truth of beliefs independently 
of their justification and context. Knowledge 
may be context-sensitive, but truth does not 
seem to be context-sensitive. Epistemological 
contextualists are interested in cases in which S 
knows that p in context C and does not know 
that p in context C*, but at the same time truly 
believes that p in context C and in context C*. 
So even if S only a-knows or b-knows that p, S 
must truly believe that p. But what notion of 
truth is operative here? Epistemological contex-
tualists are silent about this question. At least 
they have to rely on the weak disquotational 
notion of truth. One of the basic insights we 
can get from Davidson’s theory of meaning is 
that while truth is to be introduced in a disquo-
tational and language-relative form, it must at 
the same time be preserved in all translations 
into other languages. Since languages are parts 
of contexts and often vary with contexts, epis-
temological contextualists need an extended 
disquotational notion of truth (in short EDN-
truth).  
EDN-truth: p is EDN-true in language  L iff 
(a) p is the case, and (b) for any sentence q in 
language L* such that q is an adequate transla-
tion of p, q is the case.  
This notion of truth is not verificationist, 
but it does have a sort of epistemological back-
ground insofar as it relies on an empirically 
confirmed interpretation theory that deter-
mines which translations are adequate. EDN-
truth is a mild form of a contextualized notion 
of truth that should be part of mild epistemo-
logical contextualism. 
To turn now to the notion of perfect 
knowledge (c-knowledge) that is also part of a 
mild epistemological contextualism, the key to 
this notion is the idea, expressed for instance by 
Lewis, that perfect knowledge is knowledge 
that is acceptable in a context and survives new 
shifts of context – only that it is the shift to all 
better contexts that perfect knowledge must be 
supposed to be able to survive. We can restate 
this idea as follows: 
Perfect knowledge:  Let person S be in con-
text C and have belief b; then b is perfect (ide-
al) knowledge iff 
(a) b is EDN-true, 
(b) b is justified according to <L, SC, EA, 
LO, M, TR, EI>) in C, 
(c) for every context C* better than C and 
every competent speaker S* in C* it is the case                
that all parameters of C (see (b)) are accepta-
ble for S*.38 
(d) According to (c), perfect knowledge can 
be called superjustifiable. 
It can now be stated in which way mild epis-
temological contextualism can be correlated 
with the traditional JTB-account of knowledge 
such that this account can do justice to contex-
tualist intuitions: 
Contextualist JTB-account of perfect 
knowledge: Perfect knowledge is EDN-true su-
perjustifiable belief. 
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█ Veritistic approaches to social 
epistemology and the problem of relativism 
 
Veritistic social epistemology proceeds 
from the assumption that mental states display 
correctness conditions and are therefore cor-
rect-or-incorrect (in specific cases true-or-
false). Furthermore, in a certain sense the JTB-
account of knowledge is, as we have just seen, 
still part of the picture. At the same time, this 
approach is a sort of epistemological contextu-
alism. That is to say, while having correctness 
conditions is taken to be an objective property 
of mental states and the JTB-account of 
knowledge is taken to be a definition of 
knowledge that holds universally the proce-
dures of determining and verifying whether a 
given claim to knowledge is correct or not is 
seen as heavily context-dependent, i.e. relative 
to specific epistemic contexts. This epistemo-
logical relativism39 relies, among other things, 
on the following four premises: 
(a) Epistemic contexts are not better or 
worse, but are epistemologically on a par. 
(b) Perceptive reaction might be in some 
cases universal among human beings, but are 
physiological states outside of the space of rea-
sons and can therefore not belong to reasons 
justifying claims to knowledge. 
(c) Linguistic observation reports do belong 
to reasons justifying claims to knowledge but 
are, concerning their truth-value, dependent on 
specific epistemic contexts. 
(d) Epistemological foundationalism is 
wrong, since there is no neutral (context-, lan-
guage- and theory-independent) epistemic 
foundation for all kinds of knowledge. 
As indicated above, premise (a) is doubtful. 
Claim (d), while being crucial for epistemologi-
cal contextualism and epistemological relativ-
ism, does not seem to be an independent prem-
ise, since it follows from (b) and (c). On the 
other hand, (b) and (c), taken together, create 
the so called McDowell-problem and must 
therefore be examined in some more detail. A 
solution of the McDowell-problem is required 
for clarifying the relation between epistemolog-
ical relativism. 
Here is a brief version of McDowell’s prob-
lem: 
(a) The following assumptions seem to be 
compelling: 
(i) The idea that our thinking is representa-
tional, i.e. correct-or-incorrect, implies that our 
thinking is answerable to the empirical world, 
viz. to empirical experience. 
(ii) Minimal empiricism: Empirical experi-
ence constitutes a tribunal for justifying our 
representational thinking about the world. 
(iii) Justification operates in the space of 
reasons. 
(iv) Empirical experiences including percep-
tions are natural phenomena belonging to the 
realm of nature. 
(b) Assumptions (i)–(iv) in (a) are incon-
sistent. For if (iii) and (iv) are true, then (i) and 
(ii) cannot be correct. That is to say, the truth 
of (iii) und (iv) makes it impossible to see that 
minimal empiricism is acceptable and that our 
thinking is answerable to the empirical world.40 
The solution of this problem McDowell 
himself suggests relies basically on the old idea 
that our perceptions (being the core of empiri-
cal experience) are language – laden and can in 
this way belong to the space of reasons. So it is, 
according to McDowell, not perception, but 
our linguistic reports of perceptive states that 
constitute the empirical tribunal for our think-
ing about the world. 
This is not an entirely new idea, though, 
and it does not get us want we need. For we 
need to see that perceptions themselves, not 
perception reports, can provide an empirical 
tribunal for our thinking about the word. That 
is, we must be able to see that perceptions, not 
only perception reports, may belong to a sort of 
space of reasons. This intuition has been an in-
tellectual taboo in modern philosophy – at least 
since Kant published the Critique of Pure Rea-
son. But modern cognitive psychology of per-
ception shows that this intuition is correct.  
The general psychological picture of the pro-
cessing of distal stimuli leading to conscious percep-
tions consists of a number of different stages: 
(1) There exists an external world consisting 
of objects and events having certain properties 
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(minimal realism).  
(2) Due to their properties, these objects 
and event generate distal stimuli (for instance 
photons or sound waves with certain frequen-
cies) such that the properties of the objects and 
events can be mapped into the properties of the 
distal stimuli. 
(3) In the visual case (which serves in the 
following steps as example), the distal stimuli 
are transformed into an inverted image on the 
retina (this goes also, for instance, for audi-
tion).  
(4) The retina contains photoreceptor cells 
that transform the image (that maps the prop-
erties of the distal stimuli) into electrical signals 
(proximate stimuli) in the nervous system such 
that the properties of the distal stimuli can be 
mapped into the properties of the proximate 
stimuli (so called transduction). 
(5) Through a series of interconnected neu-
rons that are located throughout the body, elec-
trical signals are propagated from the receptors 
cells to the brain (so called transmission). 
(6) The brain transforms the proximate 
stimuli (that is, the electrical signals) into percep-
tions specifying the semantic content of the per-
ception (must still be seen as a sort of wonder).  
(7) Part of this process is an analysis of prop-
erties and a formation of separate perceptive ob-
jects and events relying on psychological group-
ing mechanisms.41 The resulting perceptions 
and emotions are representational states display-
ing sublinguistic semantic content and thus, cor-
rectness conditions.42 
(8) The neural processing of distal stimuli has 
been (as is shown by teleosemantic approaches)43 
developed under evolutionary conditions and has 
therefore been sufficiently tested. 
This picture makes room for some im-
portant assumptions: 
(a) We can distinguish between two kinds 
of justification: 
(i) X rationally justifies Y iff X and Y are 
propositionally contenful mental states or sen-
tences and X is a good reason for Y or X even 
logically implies Y. 
(ii) X broadly justifies Y if X is a reliable test 
procedure for Y. 
(b) We can distinguish between two kinds 
of spaces of reason: 
For every X and Y, 
(i) the logical space of reasons consists of all 
elements X and Y such that X logically justifies 
Y or vice versa; 
(ii) the broad space of reasons consists of all 
elements X and Y such that X broadly justifies 
Y or vice versa. 
(c) Perceptions  
(i) are representations (that is, are semanti-
cally contentful), 
(ii) are mostly reliable and correct, and  
(iii) do not belong to the realm of nature, 
but to the broad space of reasons. 
From (c) (iii) it follows that assumption (iv) 
that is part of generating McDowell’s problem 
is wrong, which makes the assumptions (i) – 
(iv) that are supposed to generate McDowell’s 
problem consistent.44 
More importantly, it follows also that per-
ceptions can broadly justify linguistic observa-
tion reports that can, in turn, be used to verify 
or falsify scientific hypotheses. Most epistemo-
logical contextualists are inclined to object that 
even if the picture outlined so far is acceptable, 
linguistic descriptions of perceptions are for-
mulated in specific languages that are part of 
different epistemic contexts. However, if one 
proceeds from a broadly Davidsonian picture 
of natural languages (as I do) and is impressed 
by Davidson’s arguments against the possibility 
of conceptual schemes (as I am), then this ob-
jection is wrong. For then it follows that lan-
guages, while being parts of epistemic contexts, 
cannot alone by themselves create different ep-
istemic contexts because there are no languages 
that cannot be translated into other languages.  
All in all, then, we are entitled to assume a 
perceptual foundation for all other kinds of 
knowledge and so stick to a version of episte-
mological foundationalism. This means, among 
other things, that the ideas that our thinking is 
representational, that, furthermore, minimal 
empiricism is true, and that, finally, we must 
distinguish between the spaces of reason and 
the realm of nature, are consistent. Henceforth, 
McDowell’s problem disappears. 
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Do these conclusions make epistemological 
contextualism and epistemological relativism 
completely obsolete? These conclusions cer-
tainly do not exclude mild epistemological con-
textualism. This is because, as we have seen, 
epistemic contexts do not consist only of ob-
servation reports and languages, but contain a 
number of further ingredients that can, and 
will, vary historically and culturally from con-
text to context. It must be emphasized, though, 
that it is only a restricted epistemological rela-
tivism (restricted by the existence of a percep-
tive foundation of knowledge) that is part of 
mild epistemological contextualism. This goes 
for theories of cultures of knowledge too. It 
seems to me that the contextualist JTB-account 
of perfect knowledge outlined in section 9 
above articulates a possible compromise be-
tween mild epistemological contextualism and 
epistemological foundationalism. 
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